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A RETURN TO STATE SOVEREIGN1Y: HOW INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES IN MARYLAND MAY STILL SEEK RELIEF AGAINST
STATE EMPLOYERS AFTER BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA v. GARRETT
I.

INTRODUCTION

At the foundation of the American political system lies a
government of dual sovereigns: federal and state. 1 Two of the
Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison,
understood when writing the Constitution that the nation would
sometimes require federal supremacy, but they never believed that the
states relinquished all of their sovereignty upon joining the Union. 2
This concept of federalism survived the American Revolution, and in
1793, the government adopted the Eleventh Amendment, 3 which
purported to offer the states some protection from a domineering
federal government. 4 However, these safeguards did not stop the
courts and Congress from abandoning a system of duel sovereignty in
favor of a federally dominated nation. 5
Today, federalism e~oys a rebirth. 6 Recent United States Supreme
Court decisions demonstrate a trend towards taking power away from
Congress and giving it back to the states. 7 In doing so, the Court has
1. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) ("As every schoolchild
learns, our Constitution established a system of duel sovereignty between
the States and the Federal government.").
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("But as the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union
or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights
of sovereignty which they had before, and which by the act, exclusively
delegated to the United States."); THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison)
("[Tjhe State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is
only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of
things, be advantageously administered.").
3. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI ("The Judicial Power of the United States shall not
be constructed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or
prosecuted against any one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
4. /d.
5. See infra notes 31-32, 39-40 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part II.A-B for a discussion of how the Supreme Court has
reasserted federalism by limiting Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
7. See generally Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next Generation, 33 Lov. L.A. L.
REv. 1629 (2000);James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the
New Federalism May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REv. 91 (2000) (noting that the Supreme Court
reinforced the states' constitutional position in the 1990s).
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reinforced the Eleventh Amendment and has begun striking down as
unconstitutional provisions in statutes that disregard a state's
sovereignty and allow private individuals to sue a state. 8
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 9 the latest in
this line of cases, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality10
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 11 in which Congress
specifically abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 12
Until recently, the issue of whether a state employee could sue the
state as its employer under the ADA remained divided among the
circuits. 13 On February 21, 2001, the Supreme Court's opinion settled
this division and strengthened state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. 14 In Garrett, the Supreme Court found that
Congress improperly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity with the ADA and thus, held that a private citizen cannot
sue the state under the ADA. 15
Some scholars fear that this decision may "leave [disabled]
employees of states without a means of enforcing their rights under
federal laws." 16 However, this decision does not eliminate an
individual's protection under state law, especially in MarylandY
While limiting the reach of the ADA is a matter of constitutional
interpretation, the goal of the ADA in eliminating discrimination
against disabled individuals is a goal worth reaching. 18 In the ADA's
original form, Congress unconstitutionally usurped power from the
8. See Leonard, supra note 7, at 92.
9. 531 u.s. 356 (2001).
10. See id. at 360 (noting that the Court took certiorari on the question of
whether a private citizen can sue the state under the ADA for monetary
damages).
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (noting that Congress instituted a federal program
that allows a state employee to sue a state employer).
13. See infra Part liLA (noting that before the Supreme Court decided Garrett,
the Seventh Circuit held that Congress unconstitutionally abrogated the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Eleventh Circuit held that
Congress did not abuse its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in enacting the ADA, and the Fourth Circuit stood internally
divided over the issue).
14. See infra Part III.B.2.
15. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
16. MatthewS. Cunningham, A Shift in the Balance of Power, Alden v. Maine and
the Expansion of State Sovereign Immunity at Congress' Expense, 35 WAKE FoREST
L. REv. 425, 440 (2000).
17. See infra Part IV.A-B.
18. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that while
Justice Kennedy has no "doubt that the American with Disabilities Act of
1990 will be a milestone on the path to a more decent, tolerant, progressive
society," the states have not violated the Equal Protection Clause to justify
an abrogation of their Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also infra notes
139-42 and accompanying text (discussing the bipartisan effort that took
place in passing the ADA, what many consider a high point of modern civil
rights litigation).
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states by ignoring both the concept of federalism and the words of the
Eleventh Amendment. 19 While the ADA serves a necessary purpose, it
should not come at the expense of state sovereignty. Nowhere in the
Constitution's text does the federal government possess an
enumerated power that justifies its assertion of the ADA over the
states. 20 Deferring to the states as independent sovereigns will not
leave individuals without a forum for redress against disability
discrimination by state employers. 21 Specifically, Maryland has
established a set of laws for unlawful employment practices that
provide protections similar to the ADA. 22 However, the inability to
receive certain damages under Maryland law23 calls for the state
legislature to amend the state disability laws to include these remedies
and make the state laws as appealing of an option as the ADA. 24
This Comment begins broadly with a discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment revolution on the federal level and concludes narrowly
with its impact on Maryland. Part II examines the history of the
judicial return to federalism. 25 Part III examines how the Supreme
Court settled the split in the circuits over the ADA's legitimacy by
allowing employees to sue a state employer with its decision in
Garrett. 26 Part IV explores a disabled employee's alternatives to
protection under the ADA, such as Maryland's disability
discrimination laws, and how these alternatives offer the same rights
and similar protections as the ADA. 27 Part V concludes that Congress
should not pass laws abrogating the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and that in Maryland, individuals with disabilities can still
sue the state under state law for disability discrimination and receive
monetary remedies. 28

19. See infra notes 193-208 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part II.A-B (noting that Congress no longer has expansive powers
to regulate the states and hold them captive under federal legislation by
using its powers under the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth
Amendment).
21. See infra Part IV.A.
22. See infra Part IV.B.2.
23. See infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text noting that under Maryland
disability law, a plaintiff's monetary damages are limited to the equitable
relief of back pay and do not include punitive or compensatory damages.
24. See infra Part IV.B.2.a for a discussion of the remedies available to an
aggrieved party under Maryland law, including cease and desist orders,
reinstatement, back pay, and equitable relief. However, unlike the ADA,
Maryland law does not allow compensatory or punitive damages. See infra
Part IV.B.2.b.
25. See infra notes 29-138 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 144-76, 192-216 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 221-98 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 324-50 and accompanying text.
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THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT REVOLUTION

In 1793, the United States Supreme Court decided to hear a case
brought by two citizens of South Carolina against the State of Georgia
to collect a debt. 29 In response to this case, an early American
Congress, which did not want a federal constitution that ignored state
sovereignty within the Union, enacted the first amendment after the
Bill of Rights: the Eleventh Amendment. 30 However, the Supreme
Court did not give great deference to the new amendment and
continually sought to limit its application. 31 The Supreme Court
allowed Congress to create a growing list of exceptions to the
constitutional protection of state sovereignty, hinting that the
Eleventh Amendment was, in reality, only a formality lacking any real
substance. 32 Yet, in recent years the Supreme Court is moving away
from this pragmatic approach and moving toward a more formalistic
one. 33 Recently, the Supreme Court has begun to resurrect state
sovereignty and reconstruct the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment. 34 It has reasserted a modern form of federalism by
limiting the two most frequent means that Congress uses to abrogate a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity: the Commerce Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment. 35

A.

Limiting Congress' Commerce Clause Power

Over the past few years, the Supreme Court has initiated a judicial
movement that places limits on Congress' use of its Commerce
29. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 420 (1793) (noting that the Court had
jurisdiction under the Article III power to hear controversies between "a
State and citizens of another State").
30. William Funk, States Rights with a Vengeance, 25-SPG ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws
6, *6 (2000) (noting that one purpose in passing the Eleventh Amendment
was to overturn Chisholm). See also supra note 3 for the text of the Eleventh
Amendment.
31. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (holding
that the Eleventh Amendment made Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce "incomplete without the authority to render States liable in
damages"); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (holding that Congress
could abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits by individuals);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821) (holding that the Court could
exercise its jurisdiction over a federal question brought on appeal by the
state's citizens).
32. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 30, at *6 ("For a period it appeared that Congress
under its Article I Powers could override a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity, so long as Congress expressed that intent sufficiently
explicitly.").
33. See infra Part II.A-B (noting the formalistic interpretations of both the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. See generally Levy, supra note 7. See also supra notes ~ and accompanying
text.
35. See Levy, supra note 7, at 1638-39, 1646-53.
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Clause 36 power to pass legislation that regulates the states. 37 This
movement extends to the use of the Commerce Clause to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment. 38 Before 1995, the Court stretched the
boundaries of the Commerce Clause to justify a broad array of
federally supervised laws. 39 This expansive congressional power is
most evident in "the Civil Rights Cases" of the 1960s, where Congress
used the regulation of interstate commerce as the legal justification to
enforce its social policy of eliminating discrimination in the South. 40
These cases are in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court's recent
decisions that are reeling in the federal government's power and that
are returning the nation to one of truly duel sovereigns. 41

1.

United States v. Lopez

United States v. Lopez42 marked the beginning of the Supreme
Court's return to federalism. 43 In Lopez, the Court struck down the
Federal Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990,44 because the Act lacked a
substantial relationship to interstate commerce, which is required
36. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("To regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
37. See Levy, supra note 7, at 1638-39; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 561 (1995) (holding that gun possession does not "substantially
affect[]" interstate commerce, and that Congress does not have the power
to regulate firearm possession in a school zone, leaving this activity to the
states to police).
38. See Seminole Tribe ofFla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,72-73 (1996) (concluding
that Congress could not use its Commerce Clause power to abrogate a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity).
39. Levy, supra note 7, at 1638 (stating that "it was generally easier for Congress
and the Court to rely on the commerce power for most federal
legislation"); Anna J. Cramer, Note, The Right Results for the Wrong Reasons:
An Historical and Functional Analysis of the Commerce Clause, 53 VAND. L. REv.
271, 283 (2000) (noting that Congress used its expansive Commerce Clause
power "to enact thousands of laws"); Melinda M. Renshaw, Comment,
Choosing Between Principles of Federal Power: The Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act, 47 EMORY LJ. 819, 824 (1998) (stating that
during the expansive era of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court
"effectively gave Congress the ability to regulate intrastate activities that
Congress previously was prohibited from regulating because they had been
defined as local in nature").
40. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299-304 (1964) (holding that a
restaurant's refusal to serve Mrican-Americans places a burden on
interstate commerce and justifies Congress' regulation); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-58 (1964) (noting that racial
discrimination has a negative impact on interstate commerce, which
justified Congress regulating hotels).
41. See Levy, supra note 7, at 1638-39 ("These new federalism decisions establish
limits on both the substantive scope of federal authority under the
commerce power and the means that can be used to implement regulatory
decisions within the scope of that authority.").
42. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
43. See Levy, supra note 7, at 1639.
44. 18 u.s.c. § 922(q) (1994).
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under the Commerce Clause. 45 Mter the Court returned the "police
power" to the states, it also began to focus on restoring the Eleventh
Amendment, another aspect of federalism. 46
2.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida

In the year after Lopez, the Court ruled on Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida47 and took the first step toward reasserting Eleventh
Amendment immunity. In Seminole Tribe, the Court noted that
Congress, through its power under the Indian Commerce Clause, 48
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 49 Before this case,
Congress had relied on the precedent set forth in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co. 5° when using the Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's
Eleventh Amendment protection. 5 1 However, the Court used Seminole
Tribe to overrule Union Gas and to serve as the catalyst for the growing
federalism revolution. 5 2 Seminole Tribe prevented Congress from using
the Commerce Clause to supercede the Eleventh Amendment and
checked Congress' most effective tool in regulating the fifty states as a
whole. 53 Noting the importance of enforcing the Eleventh
Amendment, the Supreme Court held that "[e]ven when the
Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a
particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States." 54
This decision aided the new federalism movement by signifYing that
45. Lopez., 514 U.S. at 561.
46. See Levy, supra note 7, at 1641-42 (noting that while the limitation of
Congress' Commerce Clause power is the more pronounced judicial
movement, the Court is expanding this federalism movement to include
the Eleventh Amendment and intends to "invalidat[e] legislative means
that interfer[e] with state sovereignty").
47. 517 u.s. 44 (1996).
48. See supra note 36 for the text of the Commerce Clause.
49. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (1988); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (noting that
this Act authorized a tribe to sue a state in federal court if the duty to
negotiate in good faith was not fulfilled).
50. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996)
51. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
52. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. The Court stated that:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background
principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of
the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is
under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.
!d.
53. See Cunningham, supra note 16, at 425.
54. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
0
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the enactment of a socially significant regulation "cannot be used to
circumvent ... constitutional limitations." 55
Seminole Tribe removed Congress' ability to use its Commerce Clause
power to authorize private suits against a state in federal court, 56 but
left unanswered the issue of whether individuals could bring such a
suit in their state courts. 57

3.

Alden v. Maine

In 1999, the Court returned to the question of whether individuals
could sue a state in their state courts with its decision in Alden v.
Maine. 5 8 The Court found that even before the Eleventh Amendment
became part of the Constitution, the protection provided by state
sovereign immunity shielded the states from non-consensual suits. 59
The Supreme Court reiterated the founders' intention to preserve
federalism by stating that "federalism requires that Congress treat the
States in a manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns
and joint participants in the governance of the Nation." 60
While sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment do not
immunize a state from all suits, 61 the Alden Court expanded the new
federalism. The Court held that Congress could not use its
enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause to authorize a
private suit against a state in a state's court because it
unconstitutionally abrogated the Eleventh Amendment. 62
Mter Seminole Tribe and Alden, the Supreme Court had once again
significantly reduced Congress' power by reintroducing the Eleventh
55. /d. at 73; see also Levy, supra note 7, at 1642 (noting that Congress could
regulate these activities, but the Court would "invalidate [ ] legislative
means that interfered with state sovereignty").
56. See Chad A. Horner, Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity, 22 U. ARK.
LITTLE RocK L. REv. 777, 777 (2000).
57. See infra Part II.A.3.
58. 527 u.s. 706 (1999).
59. /d. at 715-16 ("[T]he doctrine that a sovereign could not be sued without its
consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and
ratified.").
60. /d. at 748.
61. See id. at 755-56. First, if a state consents, sovereign immunity does not
shield a state from suits based on alleged violations of law, including
statutes that Congress properly enacts to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, because there are instances when federal law reigns supreme.
/d. at 755-56. Second, sovereign immunity only protects the suits against
states, not entities like "a municipal corporation or other governmental
entity which is not an arm of the State." /d. Finally, sovereign immunity
does not completely protect state officers from suits. /d.
62. See id. at 752-54. If the Court allowed suits authorized by Congress'
Commerce Clause power to continue in state courts, its ruling would be
inconsistent with Seminole Tribe in which it prohibited these same suits in
federal courts. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
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Amendment into the nation's jurisprudence. 63 However, Congress
still had other avenues to direct its legislation around state
sovereignty. 64 The Supreme Court next turned its attention to the
related issue of whether Congress could abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity through appropriate legislation upholding the
Fourteenth Amendment. 65
B.

Removing Congress' Power Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment66 protects individuals
from a violation of their rights secured by the Amendment, 67 and
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment68 serves as the constitutional
basis for Congress to provide legislation to meet this end. 69 However,
because the Supreme Court had historically defined Congress' power
to regulate the states in terms of interstate commerce, the Court never
clarified congressional authority under other powers, including
Section 5. 70 Most notably, the United States Supreme Court had to
decide whether Congress abused its Section 5 power in passing
legislation that abrogated state sovereignty by authorizing suits against
the states. 71 The Court gave a broad interpretation of this power in
Katzenbach v. Morgan. 72 In Katzenbach, the Court allowed Congress to
pass legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
protections, but it went further and:
63. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 758 (noting that "Congress has vast powers but not all
powers"); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
64. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 758. While Congress cannot regulate a state as freely
as it could a corporation, Congress may still require states to comply with
federal statutes if, in passing these statutes, Congress treats the states as
independent sovereigns and "joint participants in a federal system." !d.
65. Horner, supra note 56, at 780. To validly open a state to suits under a
federal statute, "Congress has to enact a law pursuant to another power in
the Constitution, such as the Fourteenth Amendment." !d.; see also infra
Part II.B.
66. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life liberty, or property, without the
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
!d.
67. !d.
68. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." !d.
69. Levy, supra note 7, at 1647.
70. !d. at 1645.
71. !d. at 1646-47.
72. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In this case, the Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in which Congress
intended to preserve the right to vote for Puerto Rican immigrants who
were registered voters in New York City and who were prevented from
voting because the election laws of New York required the voter to be able
to read and write English. !d. at 643-44.
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[H] eld that Congress could act based upon either its determination that regulating conduct may prevent future violations or on factual determinations that would establish a
violation of substantive rights as defined by the Court, and
even implied that Congress might by statute broaden the
scope of substantive rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 73
This case appeared to give Congress unlimited discretion in its use
of the Fourteenth Amendment in passing appropriate legislation, but
since 1997, the Supreme Court handed down a triad of cases, 74 which
signify that the return to federalism also concerns Congress' power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1.

City of Boerne v. Flores

In the first of the cases signifying a return to federalism, City of
Boerne v. Flores, 75 the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 76 which Congress enacted in response to Emplayment Division Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 77 In Boerne, Congress had implemented
RFRA's requirements on the states through its authority granted by
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 78 The Court did not deny
Congress' ability to pass laws under its Section 5 power to enforce the
right to free exercise of religion 79 but declined to authorize unlimited
congressional authority to enforce "appropriate legislation. "80
In City of Boerne, the Court stated that Congress abused its power
because it did not enforce a constitutional right with a remedy, but
73. Levy, supra note 7, at 1647.
74. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
75. 521 u.s. 507 (1997).
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (West Supp. V 1993).
77. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith involved the firing of two Native American employees who lost their jobs because of their use of peyote, a drug used in
their culture's religious ceremonies. /d. at 874. The Supreme Court in
Smith held that the government's regulation of drugs and other harmful
conduct does not hinge upon a balance of the government's action on an
individual versus that individual's religious belief. /d. at 890; see also Boerne,
521 U.S. at 512-14. In response to this case, Congress created the RFRA,
which "prohibits '[g] overnment' from 'substantially burden [ing]' a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability .... " /d. at 515 (alterations in original) (quoting RFRA, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1).
78. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517.
79. !d. at 519.
80. /d. ("Congress' power under [Section] 5, however, extends only to 'enforc[ing]' the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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rather changed the right's substance. 81 The Court argued that RFRA
went beyond remedying wrongs against which the Fourteenth Amendment protects, 82 and hindered federalism in two ways. First, it imposed a large load of litigation onto the state courts. 83 Second, it
usurped the states' traditional regulatory power. 84 The Court concluded that Congress exceeded its authority in enacting RFRA because it violated the system of separate powers in the federal
government, but more importantly, it upset the state-federal balance
in favor of federal supremacy. 85

2.

Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank

Mter Bourne, the Supreme Court continued to reserve more
autonomy for the states. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 86 the Supreme Court examined
the constitutionality of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act87 ("Patent Remedy Act"). 88 With the Patent
Remedy Act, Congress specifically abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity by exposing the states to suits for patent
infringement. 89 Mter Seminole Tribe, 9 Congress could not abrogate
state sovereign immunity using the Commerce Clause, but the federal
government argued that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
justified the legislation. 91 However, the Court again held that
Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute and "that for
Congress to invoke [Section] 5, it must identify conduct transgressing
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must tailor
its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct."92
The Court found that Congress did not include any constitutional
justification for the abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment93
and held as unconstitutional the use of Section 5 to enforce this
legislation. 94

°

81. See id. ("[Congress] has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.").
82. Id. at 534.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 536.
86. 527 u.s. 627 (1999).
87. 35 u.s.c. § 296 (1992).
88. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631.
89. Id. at 630.
90. See supra Part II.A.2 for a discussion of Seminole Tribe.
91. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 638-39.
92. Id. at 639.
93. Id. ("In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no
pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of
constitutional violations.").
94. Id. at 647.
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Acknowledging that Congress did not have a constitutional basis to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Court also added a powerful
warning to Congress that it must allow the states to provide
regulations and that it could not regulate every aspect of the country
from the nation's capital. 95 Congress had created the Patent Remedy
Act because a patent infringement that does not have a remedy would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 96 However, Congress provided
its own remedy without determining whether the states could regulate
this problem themselves. 97 Congress "barely considered the
availability of state remedies for patent infringement and hence
whether the States' conduct might have amounted to a constitutional
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment."98
At the congressional hearings for the Act's adoption, witnesses
testified about potential state remedies. 99 One witness stated that,
"[t]he primary point made by these witnesses, however, was not that
state remedies were constitutionally inadequate, but rather that they
were less convenient than federal remedies, and might undermine the
uniformity of patent law." 100 The Court noted the importance of
uniform patent laws but held that this rationale could not justify the
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 101

3.

Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents

In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 102 the most important of the
three cases, the Supreme Court held that Congress had exceeded its
Section 5 power by abrogating state sovereign immunity with the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 103 (ADEA). 104 Congress
enacted the ADEA to eliminate age employment discrimination. 105
Originally, the ADEA offered to an employee claiming age
discrimination a remedial civil suit against any private employer who
violated the Act. 106 However, in 1974, Congress extended the
meaning of "employer" and "employee" to cover state employers and
employees, and in effect extended the "application of the ADEA's
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

!d. at 645.
!d. at 639.
!d. at 640.
!d. at 643.
!d.
!d.
!d.
528 u.s. 62 (2000).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67.
See id. at 66 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1), which states that it is unlawful for
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual's age").
106. !d. at 67.
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substantive requirements to the States." 107 The Supreme Court
concluded that this statutory revision indicated Congress' intent to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to civil suits
brought by private citizens. 108 Repeatedly, the Court found that no
ambiguity existed in the ADEA's language, and the Court read
Congress' words as a usurpation of state sovereignty. 109
In Kimel, the issue centered on Congress' power set by Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to expose the states to civil suits under
the ADEA. 110 Looking at the ADEA, the Court conCluded that the Act
was not "appropriate legislation" under Section 5Y 1 Because the
ADEA does not protect "a suspect class," 112 and does not fall under
"equal protection jurisprudence," 113 the Court concluded that
Congress' use of Section 5 does not merit the abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 114 Additionally, the Court went back to the
congressional record in an effort to find a justification for Congress'
paternalism over the states passing the ADEA, and it found none. 115
Justice O'Connor, in writing for the Kimel court, could have
concluded her opinion with Congress' misappropriation of its Section
5 power with respect to a government of duel sovereigns, but she did
107. /d. at 68 (noting that the revision of 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) includes state
employers and employees).
108. /d. at 67.
109. /d. at 74.
110. /d. at 80. The Court's recognition that "the Eleventh Amendment and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by
the enforcement provisions of [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
/d. (citations omitted).
111. /d. at 82-83. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress broad
power to secure the rights and protections guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and it grants Congress the ability to create
remedies, and to deter future violations of the Amendment. /d. at 80.
However, Section 5 also imposes limits upon Congress only to "enforce"
constitutional violations, and not determine what constitutes one. /d. at 81
(noting the separation of powers issue and the Court's ultimate
responsibility to determine the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive
meaning).
112. Unlike race and gender, age does not qualify as a suspect class, a class that
deserves more protection under the Equal Protection Clause. /d. at 83.
"Older persons, again, unlike those who suffer discrimination on the basis
of race or gender, have not been subjected to a 'history of purposeful
unequal treatment."' /d. (citations omitted). Governmental age
discrimination only requires rational review; thus "[s]tates may discriminate
on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the
age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." /d. at 83.
113. /d. at 87-88 (stating "that the ADEA's protection extends beyond the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause").
114. /d. at 67.
115. /d. at 91 ("A review of the ADEA's legislative record as a whole, then, reveals
that Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local
governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against their
employees on the basis of age.").
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not. The Court again referred to the states' laws for remedies
concerning age discrimination by state employers, and it reassured
employees that without this federal legislation, the country would not
leave its elder employees without recourse. 116 Justice O'Connor
found little evidence of rampant age discrimination by a state in its
employment practices, but if any existed, she stated that an individual
would have a state remedy: 117 "State employees are protected by state
age discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from
their state employers in almost every State of the Union." 118 In stating
this, the Court wanted to send a message to Congress that it should
ensure that the states have adequate remedie.s before it legislates. The
Court reminded Congress that once again, it is not the substance of
the legislation that is important, but rather that these laws do not
violate a state's rights.
4.

The Dissents: Criticism of the New Federal Movement

While the United States Supreme Court continues to release
opinions supporting the return to federalism, 119 this movement does
not have the support of the entire Court. 120 In both Kimel121 and
Florida Prepaid, 122 the Supreme Court was split five to four with a slight
majority in favor of preserving state sovereignty through the Eleventh
Amendment. 123
In Kimel, the four anti-federalist Justices began their dissent with the
position that Congress does have the power to impose its regulation
over the states. 124 They concluded that Congress could use the ADEA
to eliminate work-related age discrimination against both private and
state employers. 125 They reasoned that saying otherwise would strike
at the heart of the way Congress passes laws that bind our society. 126
The dissent found that neither the Eleventh Amendment nor state
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

124.
125.
126.

Id. at 91-92.
/d. at 91.
/d.
See supra notes 6-8, 33-35 and accompanying text.
Funk, supra note 30, at 7.
528 U.S. 62 (2000). See also supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the
majority's decision in KimeL
527 U.S. 627 (2000). See also supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the
majority's decision in Florida Prepaid.
Funk, supra note 30, at 6-7. "Kimel, like the other Eleventh Amendment/
states rights cases, was a 5-4 decision, with the Court splitting along what is
becoming an increasingly frequent fault-line - Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas,
O'Connor, and Kennedy v. Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens." I d. at 7.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 93 (noting that Justice Stevens was joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Id. The dissent equates the ADEA's goals to those of wage and health
regulations. /d.
/d. ("Congress' power to authorize federal remedies against state agencies
that violate statutory obligations is coextensive with its power to impose
those obligations on the States in the first place.").
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sovereign immunity places any limitations on Congress' ability to
implement remedies against anyone who violates a federal statute. 127
The dissent in Kimel saw sovereign immunity, not as a system of the
federal and state governments working independently as part of a
single union, but as an "ancient judge-made doctrine." 128 They
believed that the majority's form of neo-federalism incorrectly
manipulated and misplaced the ideals that the founders preached. 129
The dissent did not want the Court to serve as the protector of
federalism 130 because the "structural safeguards" in place when
Congress passes a law should automatically preserve the states'
interests. 131 The dissent concluded that the states have their voices
heard when Congress enacts a law because each state is given an equal
voice in the Senate by sending two representatives. 132 Accordingly,
the dissent argued for the ADEA's constitutionality because one "can
safely presume that the burdens the statute imposes on the
sovereignty of the several States were taken into account during the
deliberative process leading to the enactment of the measure." 133
While the majority used its opinion to attack Congress' use of
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize the ADEA's
abrogation of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, 134 the dissent
in Kimel chose to criticize the majority's assertion of federalism. 135 In
the dissents' view, Congress passed a valid law; it did not abuse its
power. 136 The dissent argued that the majority's return to states'
rights forced the Court to examine the extent of Congress' power
granted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 137 The
dissent accused the majority of 'judicial activism" when it decided
Seminole Tribe, Alden, Florida Prepaid, and Kimel, and demanded that
this abuse of judicial power face opposition. 138

127.
128.
129.
130.

/d.

/d.
/d.
/d. at 93, 95. "[T] he Framers did not view the Court as the ultimate
guardian of the States' interest in protecting their own sovereignty from
impairment by 'burdensome' federal laws." /d. at 95.
131. /d. at 93.
132. /d.
133. /d. at 96.
134. See supra Part II.B.3.
135. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97 (noting that "today's decision ... rests entirely on a
novel judicial interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which
the court treats as though it were a constitutional precept").
136. See id. at 98.
137. See id. (stating that the Court has unnecessarily been forced "to resolve
vexing questions of constitutional law respecting Congress' [Section 5]
authority").
138. /d. at 98-99.
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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
American public has praised the Act as the hallmark of modern
American civil rights legislation. 139 The Act stands as a symbol of our
nation's accommodation of all of its disabled citizens. 140 Political
analysts regard the Act as evidence of the good that can come out of a
bipartisan effort in the federal govemment. 141 Few can argue against
the ADA's purpose of providing a "clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 142 However, before the Supreme Court decided Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 143 applying the Eleventh
Amendment to the ADA caused a lot of confusion throughout our
nation's courts. 144

A.

Various Approaches in Applying the Eleventh Amendment to the ADA
Among the Circuits

Two schools of thought existed concerning the issue of whether
Congress violated the Eleventh Amendment when it passed the ADA,
allowing state employers to be sued under the Act. The ADA included
a regulatory scheme that allowed individuals to sue a state in federal
court for monetary damages, and this issue divided the circuits before
the Supreme Court intervened. 145
1.

The Seventh Circuit's Approach

First, some courts advocated a form of neo-federalism, which
enforces the Eleventh Amendment and demands that Congress
respect state sovereignty through its legislation. In Erickson v. Board of
Governors of State Colleges and Universities for Northeastern Illinois
University, 146 the Seventh Circuit started where the United States
Supreme Court left off; it looked at the Court's last three decisions
139. Thomas D. Kershaw, An ADA Primer: What the General Practitioner Should
Know, 43 Aovoc. 8, 8 (Sept. 2000).
140. Id.
141. Id. (noting that when the ADA was passed in 1990, President George H. W.
Bush held office); see also Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REv. 27, 30, 30 n.2 (2000) (noting
the overwhelming bipartisan approval of the ADA in both the Senate and
the House).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000).
143. 531 u.s. 356 (2001).
144. See id. at 363 (stating that the court granted certiorari "to resolve a split
among the Courts of Appeals"); see also infra Part liLA.
145. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363.
146. 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000).
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concerning Congress' Section 5 power. 147 In Erickson, the Seventh
Circuit equated the ADA to the ADEA, 148 first, by holding that the
ADA explicitly abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment, 149 and second, by holding that disability
discrimination only requires rational review under the Equal
Protection Clause. 150 Referring to Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 151
the Court understood that the government's consideration of an
employee's disability is a constitutional issue. 152 The Court held that
if the RFRA 153 and the ADEA "exceed the [Section] 5 power, then so
does the ADA - at least to the extent it extends beyond remedies for
irrational discrimination." 154
2.

The Eleventh Circuit's Approach

Other courts have held that Congress properly abrogated the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity with the passage of the ADA. In
Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees, 155 the
Eleventh Circuit examined the ADA's abrogation of state sovereignty
and held that states are not immune from private civil suits under the
ADA. 156 The Eleventh Circuit stated that Congress showed a clear
intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity with the ADA, and that
the Eleventh Amendment does not shield any state from a lawsuit. 157
It concluded that "the ADA is a valid exercise of the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the states do not have
sovereign immunity from claims brought under the ADA." 158

147. /d. at 947 ("Three times during the last four Terms, the Supreme Court has
addressed the extent of the legislative power under [Section] 5.").
148. See supra Part II.B.3 for discussion of Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents and
why the Supreme Court held that the ADEA was an unconstitutional
abrogation of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
149. Erickson, 207 F.3d at 947.
150. /d.
151. 473 u.s. 432 (1985).
152. See Erickson, 207 F.3d at 949.
.
153. See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of City of Boerne v. Flores and why the
Supreme Court held that RFRA violated the Eleventh Amendment.
154. Anckson, 207 F.3d at 951.
155. 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999), rev'd, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress validly abrogated the
Eleventh Amendment and individuals may sue the state). See also infra
Part III.B for a discussion of the facts and the Supreme Court's decision.
156. Garrett, 207 F.3d at 1216.
157. /d. at 1218 (noting that in 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1994) "Congress [had]
unequivocally expressed its intent for the ADA to abrogate sovereign
immunity").
158. /d.
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The Fourth Circuit's Approach

The Fourth Circuit, the circuit that presides over Maryland, stood
internally divided over this issue. 159 In Amos v. Maryland Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services, 160 the Fourth Circuit held that
private ADA claims were allowed against state prisons. 161 Here, the
court examined the history that Congress had compiled of past
discrimination against individuals with disabilities to prove that a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause had occurred. 162 With the
existence of sufficient evidence, the ADA "[was] indeed adequately
justified as remedial legislation and therefore fully within the scope of
Congress' enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment." 163
Because the court determined that Congress did not exceed its
Section 5 power in enacting the ADA, Maryland could not assert the
defense of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 164
Conversely, the same circuit, in the same year, issued another
decision that advocated state sovereignty. 165 In Brown v. North Carolina
Division of Motor Vehicles, 166 the Fourth Circuit held unconstitutional a
regulation based on the ADA that prohibited the state from charging
disabled drivers five dollars for a placard that enabled them to park in
handicapped spots. 167 The court recapped the history of North
Carolina's system of accommodating the disabled with parking. 168 It
then emphasized that with an adequate state system in place, the
federal government decided to implement the ADA. 169 Because
disability discrimination only receives rational review under equal
protection analysis, 170 this court concluded that Congress could only
159. CompareAmos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999)
(hofding that an individual may sue a state under the ADA), with Brown v.
N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding as
unconstitutional a regulation that requires an accommodation by the
state's motor vehicle agency).
160. 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999).
161. /d. at 223.
162. /d. at 218-19 ("When enacting the ADA, Congress made several findings of
both past and present discrimination against the disabled in the country's
general population that it had determined violated the Equal Protection
Clause.").
163. /d. at 219.
164. See id. at 223 ("The State of Maryland is entitled under the 11th
Amendment of the United States Constitution to immunity from suit under
the ADA unless Congress has validly abrogated that immunity. . . . The
defense of sovereign immunity is not available to Appellees in this case.").
165. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
166. 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
167. !d. at 701.
168. /d. (noting that since 1972, the State provided parking for the disabled and
it has maintained and improved this system over the years).
169. !d. ("Nearly twenty years after North Carolina began providing for
handicapped parking, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities
Act.").
170. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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use Section 5 to pass the ADA over the existing state law if the state
clearly demonstrated animus to this group. 171 The court did not find
the animus necessary to justify the abrogation of state sovereignty. 172
Two separate interpretations of the ADA's validity exist, but the
Supreme Court provided some clarity and cohesion in deciding Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett. 173 The Supreme Court
continued the federalist revolution by advocating state sovereignty. 174
It removed the ability of individuals to sue the state for disability
discrimination under the ADA. 175 While the Court held one aspect of
the ADA unconstitutional, it also recommended that individuals who
seek redress against the state look to their own state's laws for
remedies. 176

B.

The United States Supreme Court's Decision in Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett

1.

Factual and Procedural Background

Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett177 involved two
separate plaintiffs, both of whom worked for the State of Alabama. 178
Patricia Garrett worked for the University of Alabama at Birmingham
Hospital, where she served as the Director of Nursing. 179 During her
employment, she developed breast cancer, which forced her to take a
lot of time off work for her medical treatment. 180 When she came
back to work, her supervisor informed her that she could no longer
hold a director position, and she had to take a lower paying, less
prestigious position. 181
The other plaintiff, Milton Ash, worked for the Alabama
Department of Youth Services as a security guard. 182 He originally
had chronic asthma that required him to avoid carbon monoxide and
cigarette smoke, and he later leamed that he suffered from sleep
apnea. 183 To accommodate his disabilities, Ash asked his employer to
171. See Brown, 166 F.3d at 707.
172. Id. "Animus 'in the air,' however, does not permit Congress to effect a
wholesale redistribution of power between the states and the central
government." Id.
173. 531 u.s. 356 (2001).
174. See infra Part III.B.2.
175. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
177. 531 u.s. 356 (2001).
178. Id. at 362.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 114 (26th ed. 1995) (defining
"apnea" as an "[a]bsence of breathing," and "sleep apnea" as apnea "during
sleep, associated with frequent awakening and often with daytime
sleepiness").
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reassign him to the day shift and place him in a location where he
would avoid smoky areas. 184 When the state employer refused to
provide these accommodations, Ash filed suit with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission alleging discrimination. 185
Mter filing suit, Ash noticed that his performance evaluations had
suffered. 186
Both plaintiffs sued the State under the ADA for money damages in
federal district court. 187 The State made a motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the ADA unconstitutionally abrogated its
protection under the Eleventh Amendment and that Congress had
exceeded its power in enacting this portion of the Act. 188 In a single
decision, the district court granted summary judgment, siding with
the State. 189 However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit consolidated
both cases and held that Congress did not exceed its power in
enacting the ADA, and that the states could not claim Eleventh
Amendment immunity as a defense. 190 The United States Supreme
Court then granted certiorari "to resolve a split among the Courts of
Appeals on the question whether an individual may sue a State for
money damages in federal court under the ADA." 191
2.

Legal Analysis

The majority in Garrett192 began its rationale with the rule that if the
Eleventh Amendment applied, private individuals could not sue a
state in federal court, under federal legislation, without the state's
consent. 193 However, the Court noted that there are times when
Congress could use its constitutional authority to abrogate this
immunity. 194 For a federal regulation to supercede state sovereignty
and impose compliance on the state governments, Congress must
affirmatively answer two questions. 195 The first question is whether
Congress expressly authorized private suits against the states. 196 With
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 362.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id. at 360 (noting that this case was decided by a five to four Court in which
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas joined for the
majority).
Id. at 363. "The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that
non-consenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal
court." Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the ADA, Congress satisfied this requirement. 197 The ADA specifically
provides that states cannot shield themselves from private suits filed
under the ADA. 198
According to the Court in Garrett, the second question Congress
must answer is whether Congress possesses the constitutional
authority to regulate the subject matter proposed in the prospective
legislation. 199 For this question, the Court examined whether
Congress had the constitutional authority to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment from the states through the ADA. 200
The Supreme Court had already removed Congress' Commerce
Clause power as a valid source of constitutional authority to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment, 201 but Congress can force states into
federal court with appropriate legislation under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 202 As the Court noted, with the ADA
Congress clearly used Section 5 as a basis for enacting this
legislation. 203 However, legislation intended to prevent disability
discrimination does not constitute "appropriate legislation" under
Section 5 because the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not afford individuals with disabilities "suspect
class" status. 204
197. /d. at 363-64 (stating that the "first of these requirements is not in dispute
here").
198. /d. at 364 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12202, the Court noted that Congress wrote
that "'[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter'").
199. /d.
200. /d. ("The question, then, is whether Congress acted within its constitutional
authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money
damages under the ADA.").
201. /d. (noting that Congress cannot use its power enumerated in Article I to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment); see also supra Part II.B.
202. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (noting that Section 5 allows Congress to pass laws
that enforce the rights secured under Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
203. /d. at 364 n.3; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (stating that one of the
ADA's purposes is "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced dayto-day by people with disabilities").
204. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366. Referring to Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
4 73 U.S. 432 ( 1985), the Court followed the rule that state action that
classifies based on disabilities only receives rational review. /d. (noting that
in Cleburne, the Court held "that such legislation incurs only the minimum
'rational-basis' review applicable to general social and economic
legislation"). This holding means that a state may classify or make a
decision based on an individual's disability and not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. /d. at 366-67. The state does not need to provide its
reason for the classification when it makes its decision, and only upon a
challenge to the decision's legitimacy, does the state need to provide "'a
rational basis for the classification."' /d. at 367 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509
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While the ADA does not demand a higher form of scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court stated that Congress could still
qualify this Act as appropriate legislation and force the states into
court if Congress found a pattern of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities by the states. 205 However, the Court found no
evidence of a pattern of statewide discrimination against individuals
with disabilities that would rise to the level of a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. 206 Of course, circumstances exist where state
employers irrationally discriminate against an individual with a
disability, but the Court reasoned that these instances were so limited
that the ADA does not qualify as appropriate legislation under Section
5. 207 Without a pattern of irrational discrimination by the states, the
Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by
private individuals against a state in federal court under the ADA. 208
Because the Court held that the ADA no longer provides
individuals with disabilities the ability to receive monetary damages
against a state employer, the Court directed such individuals to seek
redress under state law and state discrimination statutes. 209 The
Court found that every state has its own set of laws to combat disability
discrimination, and the states had these laws in place before Congress
enacted the ADA granting additional protection. 210 Through its
holding in this case, the Supreme Court once again let Congress know

205.

206.
207.
208.
209.

210.

U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). See also supra note 112 for the meaning of suspect
class.
/d. at 363. "Accordingly, [Section] 5 legislation reaching beyond the scope
of [Section] 1 's actual guarantees must exhibit 'congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end."' !d. at 365 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 u.s. 507, 536 (1997)).
!d. at 368 ("The legislative record of the ADA, however, simply fails to show
that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination
in employment against the disabled.").
/d. at 370 (finding that "these incidents taken together fall far short of even
suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which
[Section] 5 legislation must be based").
/d. at 360.
/d. at 374 n.9 ("[S]tate laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities
in employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of
redress."); see also Brief for Petitioners, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, No. 99-1240, 2000 WL 821035 app. A (2001) (noting that this
appendix contains the disability discrimination laws of all fifty states).
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368 n.5.
It is worth noting that by the time that Congress enacted the ADA
in 1990, every State in the Union had enacted such measures. At
least one Member of Congress remarked that "this is probably one
of the few times where the States are so far out in front of the
Federal Government, it's not funny."
/d. (quoting Hearing on Discrimination Against Cancer Victims and the
Handicapped before the Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities of
the House Committee on Education and Labor, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., 5
(1987)).
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that the states should share in the governance of the country, and that
Congress must enact its legislation properly and respect its cosovereignty with the states.
3.

A Five-Four Decision

The dissent in Garretf2 11 did not direct individuals with disabilities to
state law to seek remedies because these Justices concluded that
Congress did not exceed its power in enacting the ADA as appropriate
legislation under Section 5. 212 Using the same evidence that the
majority found not to constitute a pattern of irrational discrimination
by the states, the dissent concluded that the states' role in
discriminating against individuals with disabilities was more
prevalent. 213 The dissent noted that Congress had discovered that
disability discrimination existed in both private businesses and local
governments, and this finding "implicates state governments as well,
[because] state agencies form part of that same larger society." 214 The
dissent accumulated over three hundred examples of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities 215 and concluded that this could
serve as a valid basis for appropriate Section 5 legislation. 216
The fact that the Court did not come to a unanimous conclusion
based on the evidence highlights the growing division in the Court
and reflects some ideological differences. 217 As this new form of
federalism grows, the Court continues to take more power from the
federal government and give it back to the states. 218 The ADA is
merely the latest target of the federalism movement. 219 If the Court
continues to advocate state sovereignty, individuals will continually
211. !d. at 376 (noting that Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined
in the dissent).
212. /d. at 377 ("In my view, Congress reasonably could have concluded that the
remedy before us constitutes an 'appropriate' way to enforce this basic
equal protection requirement. And that is all the Constitution requires.").
213. !d.
214. /d. at 378.
215. /d. at 391-424 app. C. Specifically, in Maryland, the State did not provide
safe and accessible public transportation for individuals with disabilities
and had several instances in which deaf individuals were not provided
interpreters. /d. at 409 app. C.
216. !d. at 379 (quoting the majority, the dissent stated that "I fail to see how this
evidence 'fall[s] far short of even suggesting the pattern of unconstitutional
discrimination on which [Section] 5 legislation must be based'").
217. See supra Parts II.B, liLA for a description of the struggle between Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, and Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, and how Garrett continued the new
federalism movement.
218. Alison B. Bianchi, State Worker Cannot Sue Under ADA, Justices Rule, 2001
U.S.L.W. 169, Mar. 5, 2001, at 1 (quoting David Fram of the National
Employment Law Institute, that the "'Supreme Court is in a very pro-states'
mindset' ").
219. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
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have to turn to their own state's laws to seek assistance when they wish
to sue the State. Without the protection under the ADA, Maryland
state employees can still find similar remedies under state law, because
Maryland protects its citizens with disabilities by allowing them to sue
the State. 220

N.

MARYLAND DISABILI1Y DISCRIMINATION LAWS: HOW THE
STATE CAN PICK UP THE SLACK

In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 221 when Justice O'Connor held
the ADEA unconstitutional, she did not leave the elderly without
recourse when she directed individuals toward their own state's laws
to recover damages against state employers. 222 In Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 223 Chief Justice Rehnquist gave the
same instructions regarding the ADA. 224 Mter Garrett, the citizens of
every state must now turn to the laws provided by their state legislators
if they wish to sue the state for unlawful disability discrimination in
employment, and the citizens of Maryland are no exception. 225
Before the ADA entered our national conscience and jurisprudence,
individuals with disabilities in Maryland were able to seek some
protection from employment discrimination by relying on the laws of
their own state. 226
A.

Allowing Private Suits Against the State

Because a state's discrimination against individuals with disabilities
is only susceptible to rational review, 227 there is no constitutional
mandate for the ADA. 228 In searching for protection, nothing in state
or federal common law gave a victim of disability discrimination a
right to assert a cause of action. 229 However, Maryland saw a societal
need to protect the physically and mentally disabled from
220. See Brief for Petitioners, Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, No. 991240, 2000 WL 821035, app. A (2001); see also infra Part IV.B.2.
221. 528 U.S. 62 (2000); see also supra Part II.B.3.
222. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91; see also supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
223. 531 U.S. 356 (2001); see also supra Part III.B.
224. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
226. See infra Part IV.A-B.
227. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting that the Supreme Court
in Cleburne v. Cleboume Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), held that the
disabled do not constitute a suspect class, and are only afforded rational
review).
228. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text (noting that under rational
review, state employers could discriminate on the basis of an individual's
disability without any accountability if the state can show a legitimate
reason for doing so).
229. Dillon v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 43 Md. App. 161, 163, 403 A.2d 406,
407 (1976) (noting that at "common law no claim may be successfully
asserted on the ground that the claimant was discriminated against in
employment because of a physical handicap or disability").
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employment discrimination, and the state legislators responded. 230
Through the enactment of Article 49B, "the Maryland General
Assembly created an elaborate and comprehensive statutory scheme
for the investigation and disposition of employment discrimination
claims·.... "231

1.

Prohibiting Disability Discrimination in Maryland

Maryland adopted its legislation to curb disability discrimination in
1974, sixteen years before the federal government enacted the
ADA. 232 In 1990, the ADA became the preferred legislation to
eliminate disability discrimination in the workplace. 233 However, the
ADA's general prohibition of disability discrimination does not differ
significantly in scope from what Maryland considers an unlawful
employment practice under its laws, 234 except that the state version
·also includes protection for other classes: age, race, religion, color,
sex, national origin, and marital status. 235 Maryland specifically
protects individuals with disabilities from an employer who hires, fires,
limits, segregates, or negatively classifies an employee on the basis of
the employee's disability. 236
Ironically, before the ADA was enacted, both state and federal
courts repeatedly held that comparable federal statutes did not
preempt the states' fair employment laws. 237 In Westinghouse Electric
230. /d. at 164 n.8, 403 A.2d at 408 n.8 (noting that before 1974, an individual
with a disability did not receive any "legislative protection" for being
discriminated against until the General Assembly enacted section 19 of
Article 49B, which "is currently codified as Md. Ann. Code art. 49B, § 16").
231. See Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 715, 716 (D. Md. 1983).
232. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
234. See infra Part IV.B.
235. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 1995), with Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B
§ 16(a)(1) (2000). See also 2001 Md. Laws 340 (noting that the Maryland
General Assembly has amended section 16 to include sexual orientation as
another protected class under Article 49B).
236. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 16(a).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's . . . physical or
mental handicap ....
(2) To limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
the individual's ... physical or mental handicap ....
/d.

237. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 520 F.
Supp. 539, 550 (D. Md. 1981); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. State, 289
N.W.2d 396, 400-01 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980);
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Corporation v. Maryland Commission on Human Relations, 238 the
employer claimed that the federal statutory scheme to curb abuse and
inequality with employment benefit plans, specifically Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 239 preempted the protection
provided by Maryland law. 240 The court rejected this claim and
emphasized the need to maintain both federal and state laws. 241
When the Maryland General Assembly decided to codify the
prohibition of certain types of employment discrimination in section
16, it asserted the state's constitutional police powers. 242 When a state
legitimately uses its police powers, the court assumed that the federal
government would only invoke the Supremacy Clause on limited
occasions. 243 Here, the ideals of federalism preserved Maryland's
legislation. 244
2.

Waiving the Defense of Sovereign Immunity

Under Maryland's disability discrimination laws, the state is
accountable for its unlawful employment actions. The term
"employer" covers both private employers and the State of Maryland
as an employer. 245 To hold Maryland accountable under these
standards, the General Assembly went an extra step and waived the
state's defense of sovereign immunity. 246
While Maryland waives its defense of sovereign immunity under the
state law, this same issue made the ADA problematic. 247 When

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

244.

245.
246.
247.

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Comm'r of Labor and Indus., 608 P.2d
1047, 1057-58 (Mont. 1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
520 F. Sup_r. 539 (D. Md. 1981).
29 u.s.c. ~§ 1001-1461 (1994).
See Westinghouse Elec. Carp., 520 F. Supp. at 542 (noting that the plaintiff
claimed that federal law preempted sections 16 and 17 of Title 49B in the
Annotated Code of Maryland).
/d. at 542, 550 (noting that the "national importance of the continued
enforcement of state fair employment laws is self-evident ... ").
See id. at 542.
!d. "[W]hen a State's exercise of its police power is challenged under the
Supremacy Clause, 'we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" /d. (quoting Ray v.
Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1998) (second citation omitted)).
See id. "This assumption provides assurance that 'the federal-state balance'
will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or unnecessarily by the
Courts." /d. (quoting jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)
(second citation omitted)).
See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 15(b).
/d. § 17A ("This State, its officers, and its units may not raise sovereign
immunity as a defense against a salary award in an employment
discrimination case under§ 16 of this article.").
See supra note 208 and accompanying text (noting that without a pattern of
irrational discrimination by the states, Congress needed to have the states
waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity because Congress did not have
power under the Fourteenth Amendment to pass this legislation over the
states).
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enacting this section, 248 the Maryland General Assembly intentionally
decided to waive sovereign immunity only for the state law, and it did
not give an unconditional waiver that also included the ADA. 249 Every
state could waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity under the ADA;
however, the states were not afforded this opportunity. Without
deferring to the states, Congress unconstitutionally abrogated the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity and made them subservient to
the federal plan. 250

B.

Seeking Relief Under Maryland Law

In Maryland, an individual who has suffered employment
discrimination because of a disability may issue a complaint with the
Maryland Commission on Human Relations (MCHR). 251 A claim
filed with the MCHR will follow different procedures than a claim
filed under the ADA. While an individual who claims a violation of
the ADA initially files a claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 252 the ultimate adjudication of the
ADA claim takes place in a courtroom. 253 The EEOC conducts an
investigation to determine whether "reasonable cause exists to believe
that an unlawful employment practice has occurred or is occurring
under Title VII or the ADA." 254 Once the EEOC determines that
248. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 17A (noting that Maryland enacted this
provision in 1993, which was after Congress had established the ADA).
249. See id.
250. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
251. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 9A(a).
Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged discrimination
prohibited by any section of this article may make, sign and file
with the Human Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to as
the "Commission") a complaint in writing under oath. The
complaint shall state the name and address of the person, firm,
association, partnership, corporation, State agency, department or
board alleged to have committed the act of discrimination together
with the particulars thereof; and the complaint also shall contain
such other information as may be required from time to time by
the Commission. A complaint must be filed within six months
from the date of the occurrence alleged to be a violation of this
article.
Id.; see also THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING EDUCATION OF LAwYERS, INc., PRACTICE MANuAL FOR THE MARYLAND LAWYER, CH. Two: ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 2.4 (2000) (stating that "[e]mployment discrimination
claims may be adjudicated ... by the Maryland Commission on Human
Relations ... " ) ; Martin Marietta Corp., Aero and Naval Sys. v. Md. Comm'n
on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1395 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
former employee filed a complaint with the MCHR when he claimed his
employer discriminated against him because of his disabilities).
252. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6(a) (2000) ("The Commission shall receive
information concerning alleged violations of Title VII or the ADA from any
person.").
253. See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
254. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(a).
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reasonable cause exists, the agency may issue a notice of the right to
sue, and the aggrieved party may start the judicial process. 255
However, Maryland discrimination law differs from the ADA, because
the state has delegated the authority to handle the employment
discrimination claims to the MCHR256 and has given this agency quasijudicial power. 257 In Garrett, 258 the Supreme Court removed the
ability to sue and seek judicial recourse against a state for employment
discrimination under the ADA, 259 but Maryland's administrative
system still provides many advantages.
1.

Administrative Actions

While Article 49B requires an administrative adjudication, which
excludes the right to a jury trial that exists under federal
discrimination laws, 260 the Maryland system also has benefits. The
basic benefits of creating an agency either to implement rules or to
handle adjudications are present with the MCHR's handling of
disability discrimination suits: judicial economy and client
accessibility. 261
First, Article 49B promotes judicial economy because it diverts
employment discrimination claims away from the courthouse and to
an administrative hearing. 262 In Maryland, a claimant does not
present a case before a judge and jury; an administrative law judge
(ALJ) hears the argument instead. 263 While Maryland addresses these
claims in an administrative setting, the state's choice of forum does
255. /d.§ 1601.28(b).
256. SeeTHE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, INc.,
supra note 251, § 2.3 (noting that a state administrative agency in Maryland
is created by the General Assembly, which sets the scope of the agency's
power); see also supra note 251 and accompanying text.
257. THE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING EouCATION OF LAWYERS, INc.,
supra note 251, § 2.6 (defining quasi-judicial power as an agency's ability to
"adjudicate [ ] the rights of individual parties"); see also id. § 2.4 (noting that
the MCHR has this adjudicative power).
258. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's rationale and
holding in Garrett.
259. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
260. See Rosetta E. Ellis, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Collective
Bargaining Agreements: The Case Against Barring Statutory Discrimination Claims
from Federal Court jurisdiction, 86 VA. L. REv. 307, 312 (2000).
261. See infra notes 262-72 and accompanying text.
262. See Jason W. Bridges & CaraJ. Heflin, Recent Decisions: The Maryland Court of
Appeals, 58 Mo. L. REv. 979, 1004 (1999). "Allowing resolution outside the
court system is another function that promotes judicial economy and
efficiency." /d. at 1004 n.191 (citing Craig Lyle Ltd. P'ship v. Land
O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483 (D. Minn. 1995)).
263. SeeTHE MARYLAND INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, INC.,
supra note 251, § 2.6 (noting that the ALJ has many of the same powers as a
court judge); see also Md. Comm'n on Human Relations v. Mayor and City
Counsel of Bait., 86 Md. App. 167, 171, 586 A.2d 37, 39 (1991) (noting that
in the MCHR, the ALJ has the title of hearing examiner).
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not deprive the claimants of due process. 264 In Vavasori v. Commission
on Human Relations, 265 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held
that filing claims of employment discrimination in an agency gives
due process because it provides the '"opportunity [to be heard] ... at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' "266
Second, an administrative hearing avoids the long, complex, and
expensive process that accompanies getting an ADA claim ready for
trial. 267 To initiate an Article 49B claim, the aggrieved party may
submit a watered down complaint requiring only "the name and
address of the person or entity alleged to have committed the
discriminatory act, 'the particulars thereof,' and 'other information as
may be required from time to time by the Commission.' "268 Article
49B's administrative nature removes some of the adversarial tension
found in a judicial ~roceeding 269 and avoids a protracted suit with
prompt resolution. 2 0 Also, in an MCHR hearing, the rules of
evidence are relaxed, and an ALJ can make a decision based on
hearsay evidence alone. 271 Additionally, if both parties consent, the
ALJ can conduct the hearing over the telephone, 272 which can
enhance the more informal atmosphere of these proceedings.
While the informality of an agency hearing allows an individual to
proceed pro se, an attorney is still recommended to guide the
individual through the administrative procedure. 273 An attorney may
help preserve the record 274 for judicial review. 275 An attorney could
264. See Laura B. Black et a!., Administrative Law, 46 Mo. L. REv. 541, 566 ( 1987).
265. 65 Md. App. 237, 500 A.2d 307 (1985).
266. /d. at 249, 500 A.2d at 313 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
( 1965)); see also Black, supra note 264, at 566.
267. See Kohler v. Shenasky, 914 F. Supp. 1206, 1209-10 (D. Md. 1995) (noting
that the procedural burdens such as filing a complaint, statute of
limitations, investigations, and developing a case imposed on a litigant who
pursues an ADA claim is lessened under Article 49B).
268. /d. at 1210 (quoting Mo. ANN. CooE art. 49B § 9A(a) (1979)).
269. /d. at 1210 n.4.
270. See id. at 1210. "'The stated goal of the state administrative procedure is
the prompt identification and resolution of [ ] disputes. The
administrative scheme, including a short statute of limitations, encourages
conciliation and private settlement through the agency's intervention in
live disputes.'" /d. (alteration in original) (quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468
U.S. 42, 54 (1984)); see also THE MARYlAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING
EDUCATION OF LAWYERS, INc., supra note 251, § 2.27 ("As opposed to a
traditional court trial, agency hearings may be exceedingly informal.").
271. THE MARYlAND INSTITUTE FOR CoNTINUING EouCATION OF LAWYERS, INc.,
supra note 251, § 2.27.
272. /d.
273. /d. § 2.9 (stating that "a practitioner can never with great safety counsel a
client to appear at any kind of agency proceeding unrepresented.
However, financial realities may compel this").
274. /d.
275. See id. § 2.32 (noting that when an appeal is filed to an ALJ's order under
the MCHR, before the case can reach the circuit court, there is a
committee that serves as an intermediate step).
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also make sure that all administrative remedies are exhausted before
an appeal becomes available. 276 These benefits under the Maryland
administrative process may present a viable alternative even for those
individuals who can still sue and recover under the ADA. Overall, the
Maryland administrative process provides a valid and appealing
alternative for those who cannot seek protection in court under the
ADA.
2.

Maryland Commission on Human Relations

The desire to create judicial economy and a forum that helps move
claims through to a swift and fair resolution makes the Maryland
system alluring, but in comparison to the remedies available under
the ADA, Article 49B falls short. 277 However, Article 49B does provide
enough relief to "make whole" 278 the aggrieved party. 279

a.

Equitable Relief

The hearing examiner in the MCHR has several forms of relief
available to award the plaintiff if the examiner concludes that the state
employer committed an unlawful employment act and discriminated
based on an individual's disability. 28 First, the hearing examiner may
issue a cease and desist order to immediately stop the employer from
continuing its harmful actions. 281 Second, if the state is found to have
committed the alleged unlawful employment practice, the MCHR can
provide multiple remedies. 282 A remedy may include reinstating the
employee, hiring of the disabled individual with the possibility of
granting back pay, providing any equitable relief that the hearing
examiner deems necessary, or combining any of these remedies. 283 In
Martin Marietta Cmp., Aero & Naval Systems v. Maryland Commission on
Human Relations, 284 the Fourth Circuit held that under Article 49B
"the MCHR possesses broad powers to issue a consensual order

°

276. See id. § 2.33 ("Statutorily prescribed administrative remedies, including
administrative levels of appeal, must ordinarily be pursued and exhausted
before you can file a petition for judicial review.").
277. See, e.g., STANLEY MAzARoFF, MARYlAND EMPLOYMENT LAw § 7.12 (2d ed.
2001) ("Federal equal opportunity laws differ with regard to the relief
available to a victim of discrimination, and they differ as well with the relief
available under their primary State counterpart, Article 49B. ").
278. See id. (noting that employment discrimination laws exist so "the victim of
the discrimination should be placed in the same position he would have
been but for the act of discrimination").
279. Martin Marietta Carp., 38 F.3d at 1403 (noting that through Article 49B, "the
MCHR possesses broad powers to issue a consensual order requiring an
employer to eliminate discrimination and reinstate an employee ... ").
280. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § ll(e).
281. /d.
282. See infra Part IV.B.2.b, C.
283. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
284. 38 F.3d 1392 (4th Cir. 1994).
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requmng an employer to eliminate discrimination and reinstate an
employee, and to award further equitable relief." 285
b.

Monetary Relief

The MCHR most importantly has the option to provide monetary
relief. 286 Maryland has allowed monetary relief under the Maryland
Code since 1977, 287 but this authority is not as extensive as the
remedial powers that courts have with the ADA. Under the ADA, a
court may award both punitive and compensatory damages, 288 which
are two remedies that are unavailable under Article 49B. 289 Before
the Supreme Court held Congress' abrogation of the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity unconstitutional, 290 Article 49B was not
intended to serve as "an exclusive state remedy for such
discrimination. "291 However, after Garrett, for state employees seeking
redress for disability discrimination, the only relief they may be able to
seek is through the law of Maryland. The Maryland General Assembly
needs to amend Article 49B to include punitive and compensatory
damages, and make its law as appealing as the ADA by affording state
employees in Maryland the same protection under state law that all
other employees are afforded under the ADA.
3.

Reasonable Accommodation

Like the ADA, Article 49B also requires an employer to provide
"reasonable accommodation" for disabled employees in the
workplace. 292 While Maryland's disability laws do not expressly
285. !d. at 1403. See Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 623, 561 A.2d
179, 189 (1989); Univ. of Md. at Bait. v. Boyd, 93 Md. App. 303, 309, 612
A.2d 305, 311 (1992).
286. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 11 (e); see also Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc., 575
F. Supp. 715, 716 (D. Md. 1983) ("The Maryland Human Relations
Commission is empowered under the statute to award monetary relief for
violations thereof.").
287. Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § ll(f).
288. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(a)(2) (West 1994). Under "Section 102 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ... [t]he complaining party may
recover compensatory and punitive damages .... " Id. But see 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1981a(b) (noting that plaintiffs who sue under the ADA are limited by
caps on compensatory and punitive damages).
289. See MAzAROFF, supra note 277, § 7.12.
290. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in
Garrett).

291. See Kohler, 914 F. Supp. at 1211.
292. See Mo. ANN. ConE art. 49B § 16(a); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 361 (noting that the
ADA requires the employer to provide reasonable accommodations to
'"mak[e] existing facilities used by the employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities"' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(B)
(2000)). It is discrimination for an employer to deny "employment
opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such
covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or
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require employers to take this extra step, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has interpreted the law as requiring employers to
"reasonably accommodate" disabled employees. 293 An employer
"reasonably accommodates" if it satisfies two elements. 294 First, an
employer must make the workplace accessible to an individual with
disabilities. 295 Second, an employer must reasonably provide the
disabled employee a restructured job, or flexible work schedule. 296
Those individuals who want to hold the state accountable for its
disability discrimination have comparable protection under Maryland
state law, with the exception of slightly limited remedies, as they
would under the ADA, 297 and the administrative forum may provide
an appealing alternative to the burdensome procedures of bringing a
claim in federal court. 298
4.

Other Remedies

In addition to suing the state under state law, there are other
avenues of recourse that a disabled individual may take. 299 In Garrett,
the majority noted that the holding did not totally prohibit individuals
from taking action against the state under the ADA. 300

293.
294.
295.

296.

mental impairments of the employee or applicant." Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(9):
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modification of examinations, training materials or policies,
the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
I d.
See Martin Marietta Corp., 38 F.3d at 1398-99.
Id. at 1398-99 n.4.
Id.; see also EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000).
The court stated that "[reasonable] accommodations can take various
forms, such as making the workplace accessible to a person who is
wheelchair bound, or, of particular pertinence here, 'reassignment [of the
disabled person] to a vacant position.'" !d. at 1026 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12111(9)(B)).
Martin Marietta Corp., 38 F.3d at 1398-99 n.4. But see Olmstead v. L.C., 527
U.S. 581 (1999). The Court stated that "'[a] public entity shall make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity.'" !d. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)
(1998))
See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
See supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
See infra Part IV.C.1-3.
0

297.
298.
299.
300.
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Actions Against Local Governments

First, in Garrett, the Supreme Court concluded that smaller
government entities within the state do not receive immunity from the
Eleventh Amendment under the ADA. 301 While cities and states are
considered "state actors" and held to abide by the Fourteenth
Amendment, 302 "only states are beneficiaries of the Eleventh
Amendment." 303 Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply
to local governments, and "[t]hese entities are subject to private
claims for damages under the ADA without Congress' ever having to
rely on [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment .... "304 However,
this exception does not apply if the local entity "is an arm of the
state." 305 If the exception does not apply, and a city or county
employer discriminates on the basis of disability, then an individual
may still seek damages under the ADA. 306

b.

Injunctive Relief

A state employee can no longer use the ADA to sue the state for
money damages in federal court, 307 but there are other forms of
recourse for state employees under the ADA. 308 Another alternative
to suing the state under state law is to have private individuals seek
injunctive relief against the state. 309 When state employees are barred
by the Eleventh Amendment from seeking money damages, they may
still file a claim with the EEOC to get an injunction, but their focus
must turn from suing the State of Maryland to suing a state official
who discriminated against the claimant when acting in his or her
official capacity. 310

c.

ADA Enforcement Through the Department ofjustice

The third way to sue under the ADA and avoid state law is to have
the United States, through the Department of Justice (DOJ), enforce
the Act's standards against the state employer on behalf of the
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

306.
307.
308.

309.
310.

Garrett, 531 U.S. at 396.
!d.
!d.
!d.
Helen IIvin, EEOC Will Still Investigate Charges After Garrett, Memo Tells Field
Offices, DAILY LABoR REPORT, Nov. 20, 2001, at 11 ("Whether a local
government entity has [Eleventh] Amendment immunity must be
determined on a case-by-case basis and depends on state law .... ").
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
!d. at 360 (noting the Court's holding); see also supra note 209 and
accompanying text.
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9 ("Our holding here that Congress did not
validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private
individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons
with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination.").
!d.; see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Irvin, supra note 305, at 10.
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plaintiff. 311 Suing through the United States and the DOJ still allows
for the recovery of money damages. 312 In the aftermath of Garrett, the
EEOC sent a memo advising its field offices to pursue this avenue and
continue their investigation of valid claims of disability discrimination
by state employers against state employees. 313 While this memo raises
hope for individuals with disabilities who are aggrieved by the State of
Maryland, they should not rely on the DOJ to take their case because
this agency rarely sues the states. 314 Donald R. Livingston, a former
general counsel for the EEOC, stated that "'[t]he states have had little
to fear from litigation by the federal government.' "315
C.

Federal Attempts to Aid State Employees Under the ADA

While the Supreme Court invalidated Congress' abrogation of the
states' sovereign immunity, the ADA may once again control
employment discrimination litigation against the states if the states
waive their rights under the Eleventh Amendment. 316 However, as of
the writing of this Comment, only Minnesota has taken this step, 317
and it is difficult to predict whether other states will follow
Minnesota's lead. 318 To have other states follow Minnesota's example,
several politicians have proposed ways to entice the states to waive
their Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Senator Edward Kennedy believes that "the only way to provide
adequate protection for the right to be free from age [and disability]
discrimination is to give the employee the right to sue an employer in
court for discrimination." 319 Both Senator Kennedy and Senator Jim
Jeffords have introduced a proposal that would allow state employees
to sue the state under the ADEA, 320 and could propose a similar bill
for the ADA. 321 Because Congress cannot provide a statutory remedy
311. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
312. ld.
313. Irvin, supra note 305, at 10 (noting that the EEOC wants its field offices to
"continue to coordinate charges that have 'litigation potential' with the
Department of Justice"); id. at 12 (noting that the EEOC can conduct an
investigation and push for mediation, but it cannot sue the states itself
because only the DOJ can assume that role).
314. Id.
315. ld.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 11-12.
318. ld. at 13 (quoting Donald Livingston who stated that "'I suppose no one
knows whether other states will follow the example of Minnesota and waive
their sovereign immunity under the ADA'").
319. 69 U.S.L.W. 2156, 2157 (2000).
320. Id. at 2156.
321. !d. (noting that before Garrett was decided, Senator Kennedy believed that
the Supreme Court would preserve an aggrieved party's ability to sue a state
under the ADA and that no legislation would be necessary, but after Garrett,
one could infer that he may want to extend the proposed legislation to
apply to the ADA).
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against the states for discriminating against individuals with disabilities
in their employment practices without the states consenting to expose
themselves to suit, these Senators might have to entice the states to
relinquish their Eleventh Amendment immunity with these
regulations. 322 They have proposed a bill that would allow the states
to receive federal financial assistance in return for the states' waiver of
their sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 323
IV.

CONCLUSION SHOULD THIS BE "V."?

With the reemergence of the Eleventh Amendment, federalism has
once again become a strong force in our national jurisprudence. 324
For the past few years, the United States Supreme Court has limited
Congress' Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment powers to
legislate, because these laws unconstitutionally abrogated the states'
Eleventh Amendment rights. 325 The infringement on state
sovereignty has led the Court to restrict the provisions of federal
legislation that allow private individuals to sue the state for money
damages in federal court. 326 The ADA is the latest legislation affected
by this movement. 327
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 328 the
Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Congress
from allowing private suits against the states for money damages
under the ADA. 329 According to the Court's majority, no widespread
evidence of the states discriminating against individuals existed to
justify Congress' assertion of federal paternalism. 330 While few can
discredit the importance of the ADA, 331 the legislation's social value
cannot outweigh the necessity of respecting the states as co-equal
sovereigns. 332 The Court prohibited suits against states for damages
under the ADA while directing the aggrieved to state law. 333
Maryland law offers protection comparable with the ADA. 334 Most
importantly, Maryland law covers those that, after Garrett, are left
322. Id.
323. ld.; see also Helen Irvin, California Waived 11th Amendment Immunity to Rehab
Act Claims by Taking Federal Funds, DAILY LABoR REPORT, Nov. 19, 2001, at 5
(noting that a debate is brewing in the circuits over whether Rehabilitation
Act claims might have survived Garrett and whether states have waived their
Eleventh Amendment immunity "by accepting Rehabilitation Act funds").
324. See supra Part II.
325. See supra Part II.A.
326. See supra Part II.B.
327. See supra Part III.B.
328. 531 u.s. 356 (2001).
329. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
334. See supra Part IV.B.2, C.
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without federal recourse by allowing individuals to sue the state for
equitable relief. 335 However, two mcyor differences exist between
seeking recourse under the ADA and Article 49B.
First, Article 49B does not authorize all of the same remedies as the
ADA. 336 Most notably, under Maryland law, an aggrieved party cannot
receive compensatory or punitive damages. 337 The inequality between
the two remedies calls for the Maryland General Assembly to amend
Article 49B so that state employees who are victims of disability
discrimination may be "made whole" to the same extent as someone
who has brought a suit under the ADA.
Second, under Maryland's legislation, one must first go through an
agency rather than bring a suit in court. 338 This difference has been
criticized as to the adequacy of Maryland's remedy as compared to the
ADA. 339 The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
found that "Maryland's administrative proceeding is designed
primarily to 'eliminate the discrimination by conference, conciliation
and persuasion."' 340 However, this court believes that this quick fix
does not protect an individual's rights as well as the ADA. 341
The Maryland system may not have procedural pomp and
circumstance such as filing and pursuing a claim through federal
court under the ADA, but it does have some appeat.3 42 First, the state
administrative system does not deprive individuals of their due
process rights. 343 Second, arguing before an ALJ offers a more
informal setting that will cost less then filing a claim in federal
court. 344
While the Supreme Court has recently reestablished the Eleventh
Amendment and struck down provisions of federal statutes that
unconstitutionally abrogate state sovereignty, 345 it more significantly
appears to be directing Congress to respect federalism. Situations
exist where Congress has the ability under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity, 346 but this power is not infinite in establishing social
reform. 347 With disability discrimination, every state has already
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
34 7.

Part IV.A.2.
notes 286-89 and accompanying text.
note 289 and accompanying text.
Part IV.B.1.
Kohler v. Shenasky, 914 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 n.4 (D. Md. 1995).
id. (quoting McNutt v. Duke Precision Dental & Orthodontic Lab., 698
F.2d 676, 679 (4th Cir. 1983)).
See id. at 1210.
See supra Part IV.B.l.
See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 261-72 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts II, III.B.2.
See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See
See
See
See
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enacted legislation to curb this problem, 348 but because Congress did
not see this as sufficient, it intentionally abrogated the Eleventh
Amendment although the states already regulated themselves. 349
Congress must respect federalism, the concept that our Founding
Fathers built our nation upon. The Court has held, and may continue
to hold, that "[a]lthough the Constitution grants broad powers to
Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a
manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation." 350

Geoffrey G. Hengerer

348. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 210 and accompanying text; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12202
(1995):
A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter. In
any action against a State for a violation of the requirements of this
chapter, remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity)
are available for such a violation to the same extent as such
remedies are available in an action against any public or private
entity other than a State.
!d.
350. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).

